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Abstract. The conventional wisdom is that scale-free networks are prone to
cooperation spreading. In this paper we investigate the cooperative behaviors on
the structured scale-free network. On the contrary of the conventional wisdom that
scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading, the evolution of cooperation is
inhibited on the structured scale-free network while performing the prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) game. Firstly, we demonstrate that neither the scale-free property nor the high
clustering coefficient is responsible for the inhibition of cooperation spreading on the
structured scale-free network. Then we provide one heuristic method to argue that
the lack of age correlations and its associated ‘large-world’ behavior in the structured
scale-free network inhibit the spread of cooperation. The findings may help enlighten
further studies on evolutionary dynamics of the PD game in scale-free networks.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le
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1. Introduction
Cooperation is an essential factor for the evolution of species. For decades, scientists
have been embarking on the problem of understanding the emergence of cooperation [1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In the field of this investigation, evolution game theory has become a
powerful tool [7, 8, 9]. One of the most frequently used metaphors is the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) game [10] that is modeled to simplify individual interactions when selfish
actions provide a short-term higher payoff. In each round two players are involved in
the game. The two strategies for one player are to become a cooperator or a defector.
A cooperator is someone who pays some cost for another individual to receive a benefit.
A defector has no cost and does not deal out benefits. Cost and benefit are measured
in terms of fitness. The combinations of the strategies will be of great difference. When
both of the players choose to cooperate or to defect, each of the two will get benefit R
or P , respectively. When one player choose to cooperate and the other choose to defect,
the cooperator will get S, while the defector will get T . In the PD game, the order for
the payoffs with different combinations of strategies is T > R > P > S. So the best
strategy is to defect regardless the opponent’s strategy and assuming that strategies are
allowed to spread within the population according to their payoffs [7].
Recently, biological experiments have demonstrated that the evolution dynamics
is related to the topological structure of the media, on top of which the evolution
dynamics are performed [11]. Earlier work [2, 4, 12, 13] mainly focused on the two-
dimensional lattice, which is modeled for the homogeneous network. In these studies, a
player is constrained to play solely with its nearest neighbors. All the studies reported
that unlike in unstructured populations, cooperators and defectors can coexist in the
lattice indefinitely. However, the regular network is not suitable for modeling real
networks since a lot of empirical studies [14, 15, 16, 17] have uncovered that the degree
distribution P (k) of many real-life systems complies with a power-law form P (k) ∼ k−λ
with 2 < λ 6 3. The scale-free property shows that everyone plays a different role in the
network, which describes a kind of social diversity [18]. A famous model for generating
scale-free network is the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model [19].
The evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks has been explored in [20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25], which exhibited that cooperation is the dominating trait throughout
the entire range of parameters. In this paper, we focus on the evolution of cooperation
on a structured scale-free network, which demonstrates negative age-correlations [26].
Firstly, we introduce the algorithm for constructing the network. Secondly, we simulate
the PD game on the network, and compare the results with that of the BA network.
In contrast to the results previously obtained for the BA network, we find that the
structured scale-free network inhibits the spread of cooperation. Finally, we provide a
heuristic argument to explain why the spread of cooperation is inhibited on the network
considered, which is justified by extensive simulations.
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2. Models
Firstly let us introduce the celebrated BA model: Initially there are m0 connected
nodes in the network. At each time step, one node is added into the network and links
with m (m < m0) existing nodes. The probability that an existing node i acquires
a new link is P (ki) =
kiP
j kj
, where ki is the degree of node i. Repeat this step until
getting the desired network size. In the BA model, on one hand, the chance that
an old node receiving a new link is proportional to it age; this phenomenon is called
“preferential attachment”, also named “age-correlations”. On the other hand, the long-
range connections generated by the process decrease the distance between the vertices,
leading to a small-world phenomenon: the average path length increases logarithmically
with the network size [27].
The aging of nodes is particularly interesting. Recently, Klemm and Egu´ıluz found
that for the scientific citation network [16], the age-correlation is negative: the mean
citation rate of papers decreases with the increase of their age [26], that is to say, old
nodes have less probability to obtain links than those nodes just added into the network.
To describe this phenomenon, they put forward a new model called the structured scale-
free network (also called highly clustered scale-free network). Their model is built as
follows: Initially there is a complete graph with m active nodes. At successive time step,
one active node is added into the network connected to all m active nodes, then one of
m + 1 active nodes is randomly chosen and deactivated with probability P (kj) =
s
a+kj
with a > 0 being a constant, where s is a normalization factor defined by s−1 =
∑
i
1
a+ki
,
in which i belongs to the set of active nodes. Repeat the process until the network size
reaches the needed size.
According to the above process, we know the age correlations are greatly suppressed
since every round only the active nodes, not all existing nodes, have the chance to acquire
new links. In result, the linear topology of the structured scale-free network with local
highly connected clusters forms a long chain [28]. The power law exponent is λ = 2+ a
m
.
In this paper, we take a = m, and thus the structured scale-free network has the same
degree distribution with the BA model with λ = 3 [19]. The clustering coefficient of BA
network approaches to zero as network size grows to infinite, while in the structured
scale-free network it is an asymptotic value 5
6
for the case a = m.
After introducing the two models, we will study the evolutionary PD game on both
models in the following section.
3. Simulations
In this section, we implement the finite population analogue of replicator dynamics
in the following PD simulations. Following [2], we make T = b > 1, R = 1, and
P = S = 0 in the PD game, where b represents the temptation to defect, being typically
constrained to the interval 1 < b 6 2. In each round of evolution, one node i plays
the PD game with its directly connected neighbors, accumulating the payoff as Pi.
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Whenever the strategy of the player i with ki neighbors is to be updated, a neighbor j
is randomly selected from i’s neighborhood. If Pj > Pi, the chosen neighbor j spreads
its strategy to the player i with probability
Pj−Pi
b(max(ki,kj)) , otherwise, the player i holds
its strategy [20]. Simulations were carried out for a population with N = 10 000
individuals. Initially, cooperator and defector strategies were distributed randomly
among the players. Equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors were obtained
by averaging over 1 000 generations after a transient time of 50 000 generations. The
frequency of cooperators is a function of the parameter b for the PD game. Each data
point corresponds to 100 simulations that are 10 runs for 10 different realizations of the
same type of network specified by the appropriate parameters (the population size N
and the average connectivity z).
Figure 1 shows the results for the PD game on both networks with different values
of the average connectivity z. The BA scale-free network and the structured scale-free
network are constructed through above methods. The frequency of cooperators, fc, is
enhanced on the BA scale-free networks in the PD game, dominating over the entire
range of b (1 6 b 6 2). Notice that even when 2 < b 6 3, we have checked that the
results will not change. When 1 < b 6 1.4, both of the networks are all-cooperator
networks. As the temptation value b increases from 1.4, the frequency of cooperators
in the structured scale-free network descends rapidly while the cooperative behavior is
always blooming in the BA network. Especially, for b = 2, when z = 4, fc on the
structured scale-free network is just half of that on the BA network; when z = 8, fc
decreases to 0 on the structured scale-free network, while the BA network still shows
a remarkable survival of cooperation with fc ≈ 0.4. On the other hand, as z grows,
the advantage of scale-free network shrinks. Therefore, it can be observed from figure
1 that cooperators change into defectors more quickly with smaller temptation value in
the structured scale-free network, therefore, we can conclude that comparing with the
BA network, the structured scale-free network decreases the frequency of cooperation,
the reason for which will be detailedly analyzed in the next section.
4. Analysis
Why does the structured scale-free network inhibit the frequency of cooperators
comparing with BA network? Firstly, we are aware of that both of the BA network
and the structured scale-free network have the same power law exponent (λ = 3) in
the above simulations. So the scale-free property is a trivial factor that can not affect
the simulation results. Secondly, the clustering coefficient on the structured scale-free
network is much higher than that in BA network. Assenza et al. in [29] find that high
clustering coefficient can help the enhancement of cooperation on the scale-free networks
with a tunable value of clustering coefficient [30], which is a different network model with
the structured scale-free network. However, the high coefficient can not help to enhance
the cooperation spreading on the structured scale-free network. So what is the root
cause responsible for the inhibition of cooperation spreading on the structured scale-
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BA Model
BA Model
Figure 1. Frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the advantage b of defectors
for the PD game. The lines with filled squares show the results of structured scale-free
network in the PD game. The lines with dots are for the BA scale-free network. In the
figure, z is the average connectivity of the network. According the construction process
of the structured scale-free network, we know z = 2m. The frequency of cooperation
in the structured scale-free network is surpassed by that of the BA network in almost
the entire range of b, especially when b is large enough.
free network? From the models, we know the age correlations are greatly suppressed on
the structured scale-free network comparing with the BA network, which results in the
fact that, in the BA network, a hub is usually linked to other highly connected nodes,
while in the structured scale-free network, a hub is almost exclusively connected to low
degree nodes [31]. Also the diameter of the structured scale-free network is increasing
linearly with the network size [28].
We can illustrate this phenomena through calculating the node-distance for one
hub to others in the scale-free network as shown in figure 2. The value of node-distance
from the origin to the destination is defined as the number of nodes on the shortest path
between the two nodes. For example, the node-distance of a pair of directly connected
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BA Model
Figure 2. The average node-distance between hubs as a function of the threshold of
degree, td. A node i is called a hub node when its degree ki > td. The solid line with
dot symbols is for the structured scale-free network and the solid line with squares is
for the BA network.
nodes is 0; if one of the shortest paths between nodes i and j bypass another node k,
then the node-distance between i and j is 1, and so on. Figure 2 shows the average
node-distance between hubs as a function of threshold td. A node i can be qualified
as a hub node only if its degree ki > td. We can see that in the BA network, the
hub nodes are usually interconnected with shorter average node-distance. While in the
structured scale-free network, the average node-distance between hubs is rather high.
When td = 50, the node-distance among hubs on the structured scale-free network is
more than 100, while this value is just a slightly more than one in the BA network.
Hence, in the structured scale-free network, the hubs are connected through some low
degree nodes, which form an “intermediate region”.
For the sake of simplicity, we model the two kinds of network through two kinds of
subgraph shown in figure 3, where (a) shows a directly connected double-star for the BA
scale-free network and (b) is a double-star with intermediate region for the structured
scale-free network. In figure 3(a), without losing generality, we assume that initially
there are the unique defector locating on the right hub hr and others(including the left
hub hl) are cooperators. Set T = b, R = 1, and P = S = 0. In the first generation of the
networked PD game, the payoff of hl is pi(hl) = N and the payoff of hr is pi(hr) = Mb.
According to the evolutionary rule, the probability for the defector hub to invade the
cooperator hub is
P1 =
pi(hr)− pi(hl)
bmax(M,N)
=
Mb−N
bmax(M,N)
. (1)
Moreover, the payoff of some leaf on the right star lr is pi(lr) = 0 and the defector
hub can also invade its leaves. The probability for the defector hub to invade its leaf lr
Prisoner’s dilemma in structured scale-free networks 7
(a)
(b)
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Cooperator Defector
Figure 3. Evolution process on double-star graphs. (a) Directly connected double-
star for the BA network. The centers of the two stars are directly connected. The
left hub hl has N − 1 leaves and the right one hr has M − 1 leaves. (b) Double-star
with intermediate region for the structured scale-free network. Comparing with (a),
the hubs are not directly connected, but by the intermediate region. The degrees of
hubs are the same with (a). In this figure, we just put one node on the intermediate
region for the sake of simplifying analysis.
is
P2 =
pi(hr)− pi(lr)
bmax(1,M)
= 1. (2)
Apparently, P1 < P2, hence, the leaves aside the defector hub are easier to be
invaded by the defection than the cooperative hub. After the defector hub has invaded
some of its leaves and k (k < M) cooperator leaves survive, we get figure 3(a-2) where
pi(hr) = kb. The probability that the defector hub invades the cooperator hub changes
into
P3 =
pi(hr)− pi(hl)
bmax(M,N)
=
kb−N
bmax(M,N)
. (3)
Comparing with P1, it can be found that the cooperator hubs are harder to be
invaded by the defector hubs as the decrease of k. When k = 0, i.e., all cooperator
leaves aside the right star adopt the defector strategy, P3 reaches its minimal value
and the defector hub will definitely be invaded by the cooperator hub. Hence, after hl
changes into the cooperator, it will induce its neighbors learning its behavior and the
cooperative strategy will spread to the whole double-star graph(figure 3(a-4)).
Through the structural analysis for the structured scale-free network, we point out
that the intermediate region plays the crucial role for the evolution of cooperation.
Hence, we add an intermediate node among the two hubs as shown in figure 3(b) to
illustrate the effect of the intermediate region. We assume initially the node x on the
intermediate region is a defector and others are the same as the figure 3(a-1). At
figure 3(b-1), pi(hl) = N , pi(hr) = 0 and pi(x) = b. If x chooses hl to update its strategy,
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Figure 4. Evolution of cooperation under the PD game on the double-stars graphs.
Initially the cooperator hub hl and the defector hr are linked with the same number
of leaves, N = M = 50. All leaves are cooperators. We fix b = 1.5. The simulations
are averaged over 1000 runs. (a) The frequency of cooperation fc, on the left star (dot
line) stays at nearly 1.0. fc in the right star (dashed line) first decreases to nearly 0
as defectors invades its leaves. Then at the lowest point, hl spreads the cooperation
strategy to hr successfully. After that, the cooperators wipe up all the defectors on
the right star. (b) We add a 10-node intermediate region between the double-star as
shown in the right corner. Initially the nodes on the intermediate region randomly
choose their strategies. The left star contains all cooperators (dot line). The fc on the
right star (dash line) decreases to nearly 0 (but not 0 because of the random effect)
dramatically and stands still. The fc of intermediate region (dash dot line) fluctuates
around 0.5 as expected. The frequency of cooperation of the whole double star is
shown as solid line.
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the probability for x to turn into a cooperator is
P4 =
pi(hl)− pi(x)
bmax(2, N)
=
N − b
bN
. (4)
Also according to the above analysis, the defector hub will invade all its leaves, and
then we get figure 3(b-3). At this point, pi(x) = 1 < pi(hr) = b. It’s impossible for x to
be invaded by the defector hub with probability
P5 =
pi(hr)− pi(x)
bmax(2,M)
=
b− 1
bM
. (5)
Therefore, the defector hub will receive the benefit from x when x adopts the
cooperative strategy, furthermore, it will invade x and make x become defector again.
Then the process drops into a loop shown between figure 3(b-3) and figure 3(b-4),
alternatively. The nodes on the intermediate region fluctuate their strategies and the
defector hub is protected by the intermediate region against the invasion of cooperator
hubs, resulting in the fact that the cooperative behavior is inhabited on the structured
scale-free network for the PD game. In figure 3(b) we consider that the intermediate
region only contains one node, and in the case of multiple nodes on the intermediate
region the results do not change. Although we use the double-star graphs to illustrate the
cooperation evolution on the scale-free networks, the analysis can heuristically reflect
the microscopic organization of cooperation on the evolutionary dynamic of the PD
game.
Furthermore, we have done extensive simulations shown in figure 4 to justify our
above analysis. In the simulations we bring in a kind of random effect [22]. We
assume that there are no direct connections among the leaves but adopt a strategy
from each other with probability 0.1 which is the random strategy adoption. From
figure 4 it is observed that for the double-star graph, the defector hubs can be invaded
by the cooperator hub and after which, its neighbors also become cooperators again.
Whereas, for the double-star graph with intermediate region, the leaves around the
cooperative hub are cooperators and that around the defector hubs will hold on the
defection strategies. However, the intermediate region will change their strategies under
the influence of their neighbors. Hence, the cooperators’ frequency of intermediate
region is 0.5. Figure 4 confirms our conclusions discussed above, i.e., the isolation of
communication among hubs in the structured scale-free network decreases the emergence
of cooperation.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the evolution of cooperation on the structured
scale-free network for the PD game. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that
the cooperation dominates on the BA scale-free network, the cooperative behavior
is inhibited on the structured scale-free network. We find that neither the scale-free
property nor the high clustering coefficient is the determinant factor for the inhibition
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of cooperation spreading on the structured scale-free network. Then what is the root
cause? Comparing with the BA network, the age correlations are greatly suppressed on
the structured scale-free network. In result, hubs are usually linked to low-degree nodes
and simulations have confirmed the result that the node-distance among hubs are much
larger on the structured scale-free network than on the BA network. Furthermore,
to explain heuristically why the spread of cooperation is inhibited, we simplify the
structured scale-free network as a double-star connected by an intermediate region,
which is formed by low-degree nodes. Through detailed analysis we showed that the
lack of age correlations and associated ‘large-world’ behavior are responsible for the
inhibition of cooperation on the structured scale-free network.
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